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In January 1997 Jessica Matthews, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 
wrote an article for Foreign Affairs magazine titled, ―Power Shift,‖ arguing that after centuries of 
international relations defined by nation-states as the central actors, global politics was 
experiencing a fundamental transformation into a world of multiple influential players.  Nation-
states, in her estimation, would increasingly have to share their power with international 
institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and multinational 
corporations.  Furthermore, Matthews stated that non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such 
as international human rights and development organizations would, despite their often small 
sizes and budgets, ―increasingly . . . push around even the largest governments.‖1  Matthews‘ 
article was not alone in viewing a growing role for NGOs in international affairs; particularly in 
the 1990s, many international relations and political science scholars discussed this trend.  
However, relatively little has been written by historians on the growth of NGOs as a global 
presence.  As the diplomatic historian Akira Iriye has argued, this is problematic, because ―the 
bulk of the political science literature remains nonhistorical  . . . tend[ing] to focus on very recent 
developments or current phenomena,‖ without providing a broader historical context.2   
2 
 
The dissertation I am researching, Planetary Citizens: U.S. NGOs and the Struggle Over 
Globalization, 1972-1989, represents one small step in addressing this scholarly gap.  This 
project focuses on U.S. NGOs engaged in political advocacy on issues of global development 
during the 1970s and 1980s.  Specifically, I am interested in NGOs whose advocacy advanced a 
vision for the global economy that challenged the policies promoted by the major institutional 
drivers of globalization.  U.S. groups such as the Institute for Policy Studies and the Sierra Club 
launched efforts in these years to confront institutions such as multinational corporations and the 
World Bank, which NGOs saw as promoting policies leading neither to economically equitable 
nor environmentally sustainable development in the Global South.   
As part of my research I spent a week combing the archives at the Rockefeller Center 
(RAC), with particular attention to the records of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF).  During 
the 1970s and 1980s the RBF proved an important source of funding for a myriad of U.S. NGOs.  
My work in these archives served two main purposes in advancing the broader project.  First, a 
number of the NGOs that I am focusing on do not have their own archives; thus the records at 
the RAC represent an invaluable repository of primary source documents.  Second, as part of 
exploring NGO advocacy, one must understand the various factors that influence NGO behavior.  
Critical among these is NGOs‘ access to and relationships with funders, especially major 
philanthropic foundations.  As part of my research, I hope to further explore these dynamics, 
relying on primary sources to better understand the nuances of the relationships between NGOs 
and foundations. 
For the purposes of this report, I divided my findings into three sections.  Initially I 
discussed my research regarding U.S. environmental groups, particularly the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC), and the Sierra Club.  In the 1970s, each of these organizations became 
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involved with global environmental issues, and increasingly with the intersection of the 
environment and Third World development.  In the 1980s, these concerns blossomed into a 
coordinated campaign aimed at reforming the environmental practices of the World Bank. 
Second, I examined the records of NGOs whose driving mission was to engage U.S. 
citizens and institutions on global issues.  For this purpose, I focused primarily on the United 
Nations Association of America (UNA) and the Overseas Development Council (ODC).  These 
NGOs also provide a contrast with the organizations that are the centerpieces of my study, for 
they consciously avoided political advocacy, favoring a cooperative relationship with 
government and industry. 
 Finally, one of the main historical episodes that my dissertation explores is the campaign 
by U.S. NGOs to change the practices of multinational corporations with respect to the 
marketing of infant formula in the Global South.  This campaign found a critical base of support 
in religiously-affiliated NGOs, some of which the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) had relations 
with.  Two NGOs in particular whose records proved relevant are the National Council of 
Churches (NCC) and its affiliate, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). 
 
Environmental NGOs  
Beginning in the early 1960s, environmental issues increasingly entered the national and 
international consciousness, inspiring a flurry of new community and political organizing and 
activism.
3
  Of course, concern over protecting the natural world did not begin in the 1960s; there 
existed a number of conservation organizations, such as the Sierra Club, dating back to the late 
nineteenth century.  However, such organizations tended to focus on protecting undeveloped 
lands and did not address how human activities (particularly in an industrial era) damaged both 
the natural ecology, as well as human health. 
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In the late 1960s a new wave of NGOs emerged in the U.S., staffed mostly by well-
educated professionals, particularly lawyers devoted to working through courts and congress to 
institute policies promoting environmental sustainability.  Expanding their focus beyond 
preservation of natural lands, these groups took on a wide array of issues, such as air pollution, 
nuclear power, and the dangers of pesticides.  One of the most prominent of these new NGOs 
was (and continues to be) the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), which in many ways 
epitomizes the new wave of the late 1960s public interest NGOs.
4
  Founded in 1969, in part by a 
group of Yale law graduates, NRDC embraced what founder John Adams termed ―responsible 
militancy,‖ working within the established system to improve it.5  In focusing on NRDC, the 
files at the RAC proved to be quite valuable, particularly in reference to the NRDC.  While the 
Sierra Club maintains its own archives at the University of California-Berkeley, NRDC thus far 
has no repository for its records.  However, because the RBF was a crucial funder of NRDC, in 
particular its international program, the records at the RAC provide a rich collection of primary 
source documents concerning NRDC in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Given that ecological degradation is a global concern, it was not long before U.S. 
environmentalists began to expand their outlook and operations to become more transnational.  A 
critical event in bringing a more global perspective for U.S. environmentalists came in June of 
1972, with the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm.  Several 
U.S. environmental groups sent representatives to Stockholm and participated in forums and 
other events during the conference, including the Sierra Club, one of the first U.S. environmental 
groups to establish an international program, which it formally launched in May of 1972.
6
  While 
U.S. environmental groups came to Stockholm principally concerned with ―preservationist‖ 
issues, such as protecting the oceans and tropical forests, the Stockholm conference, and 
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particularly a series of speeches by leaders and delegates from Global South nations, forced U.S. 
NGOs to consider more seriously the tensions and links between environmental protection and 
economic development.
7
   
In the early and mid 1970s, social and economic development represented merely one 
among a long list of global environmental challenges the Sierra Club and NRDC‘s international 
programs sought to address. For example, in its first RBF grant proposal for the international 
program, NRDC stated that it would tackle, among other issues, nuclear energy exports, offshore 
oil drilling, water pollution, and corporate responsibility.
8
  The desire to work on so many efforts 
raised concerns about overextension among the RBF staff as they considered NRDC‘s requests 
for financial backing of the project.  For example, a memo from RBF consultant Gene Setzer to 
program associate Gerald Barney, commenting on NRDC‘s initial proposal to create an 
international program, cautioned that ―historically each of them (environmental and public 
interest NGOs), has started with a fairly narrow area of interest, and then, finding that ‗you can‘t 
do only one thing,‘ additional items are added seriatim, usually on a ‗project‘ basis.‖9   
Concerns such as these, point to some of the core issues and tensions arising from NGO-
foundation relations.  Given that foundations do not have unlimited sums of money, there is 
naturally a demand for forms of accountability from those receiving grants.  One method for 
foundations to create mechanisms for accountability emphasizes funding specific projects with 
concrete goals, achievable within a year or two.  As Barney commented in a memo on funding 
environmental NGOs, the RBF ―should not become involved in general support of US NGOs.  
We may want to help on specific projects, but in general these organizations haven‘t shaken 
down and become as effective as they should.‖10  Such attitudes help make sense of the support 
NRDC did and did not receive in the 1970s from the RBF.  In 1976, NRDC‘s international 
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program received a grant to investigate ways in which U.S. environmental NGOs could better 
coordinate efforts with foreign NGOs.  However, in general, the program found itself relying 
primarily on general support money NRDC received, rather than specific grants for global 
projects.
11
   
A major step forward for U.S. environmental groups to engage in global development 
concerns began in the mid-1970s when several NGOs coordinated an effort to push for 
environmentally-minded policies to be incorporated into the work of the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID).  In 1975, the Sierra Club, the Environmental Defense 
Fund (EDF), and NRDC launched a lawsuit against USAID, demanding that it comply with the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), with specific reference to USAID‘s funding of 
exports of the pesticide DDT to Global South nations.  A major goal for the environmental 
groups centered on getting USAID to agree to conduct environmental impact assessments (EIAs) 
on all projects.
12
  USAID settled the lawsuit, and by 1976 had commenced a serious program of 
reform to make its operations more environmentally conscious.
13
   
The USAID effort provided a framework for U.S. environmentalists to push for reforms 
of other institutions involved in environment and development; as an internal RBF memo from 
William Moody pointed out, this effort ―opened the door for many NGOs to encourage . . .  
international financial and technical assistance agencies to give more attention to sustainable 
development.‖14  However, reforming USAID would prove a relatively easy task compared to 
the NGOs‘ next campaign.  As a federal government agency, it was susceptible to many legal 
and political pressures that multilateral institutions are not.  Furthermore, many of the major 
environmental reforms enacted by USAID came during the Carter administration, which took a 
generally sympathetic line in responding to environmentalists‘ demands.  Far more difficult 
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would be the next set of institutions U.S. environmentalists would turn to as part of promoting 
global sustainable development: the multilateral development banks (MDBs), such as the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank (ADB) and most notably, 
the World Bank. 
In the early 1980s environmental advocates at NRDC, the Environmental Policy Institute 
(EPI), and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) began to look for a project they could 
undertake jointly that combined concrete short-term objectives, while also allowing 
environmentalists to make a major impact on global policymaking.  This search led them to the 
World Bank and the other MDBs.
 15
  The World Bank, the largest development organization in 
the world, also serves as a center of policy thinking about development issues.  It had long 
promoted itself as a leader in incorporating environmental protection and sustainability in its 
lending programs.  However, as the environmentalists emphasized again and again, the World 
Bank‘s rhetoric far exceeded its actual implementation of environmentally sustainable policies.  
One example environmentalists invariably pointed to was the fact that, even into the early 1980s, 
the World Bank employed only six staff working on environmental matters out of a workforce of 
more than six thousand.
16
   
The environmentalists adopted a multi-pronged strategy in confronting the World Bank.  
In part, the campaign involved traditional lobbying in which NRDC, Sierra Club, EPI and other 
groups, helped to organize and gave presentations on the MDBs and the environment at 
congressional hearings, seventeen of which were held between 1983 and 1986 alone.
17
  
Furthermore, the environmentalists allied themselves with sympathetic staff at the Treasury 
Department, which possesses great influence over U.S. policies towards the MDBs.  U.S. NGOs 
(with the strong encouragement of RBF staff) also worked to build ties with NGOs in Europe 
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and the Global South, which served the dual function of giving U.S. groups access to more 
information about the on-the-ground impacts of MDB projects, as well as additional sources of 
political pressure.  As the campaign gained both momentum and concrete achievements, it 
became an ever greater focus of U.S. environmental NGOs‘ international efforts.  Whereas 
NRDC‘s first report on its international activities included a broad sweep of issues, their funding 
report for 1987 focused entirely on efforts aimed at the World Bank and USAID.  Similarly, after 
over a decade of being based in New York and centering its work on the U.N., the Sierra Club 
moved its international program to Washington, D.C., with the explicit mission of engaging in 
―action campaigns to influence the international policies and activities of the U.S. 
government.‖18 
By the end of the decade, EPI, NRDC, Sierra Club, and their allies around the world 
could point to a record of measurable achievements.  Among these included the 1987 re-
organization of the World Bank‘s structure, under new president Barber Conable, which included 
the formation of a much expanded Environment Department.  Furthermore, the Sierra Club 
drafted legislation that was passed in 1989, requiring the U.S. executive director at the World 
Bank to vote against any World Bank loan which lacked an environmental impact assessment.  
The World Bank also began reaching out more systematically to NGOs, and in particular, 
recognized the significance of the environmentalists‘ effort.  In a 1988 speech for example, 
World Bank Senior Vice President for Operations, Moeen A. Qureshi, acknowledged the 
environmentalists‘ accomplishments, stating that ―[e]nvironmental NGOs have helped us 
become more keenly aware of natural resource and resettlement issues.  I am grateful to them for 
that, even though their criticism has sometimes been harsh.‖19   
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The MDB campaign made a very strong impression on the RBF staffers working with the 
environmental groups.  Corresponding in regard to the Sierra Club‘s booklet, Bankrolling 
Disasters (which served as a primary source of educational literature for the campaign), RBF 
consultant Thomas W. Wahman exclaimed in a letter to Larry Williams, of the Sierra Club, that 
reading the report made him ―proud to know you and everyone else associated,‖ adding that he 
felt this ―document will also serve to undergird the Sierra Club‘s commitment to its international 
program.  If I were a member of Sierra, I would say ‗Right On!‘ I might even join.‖20  The 
campaign‘s rapid growth and record of success provided the RBF staff with funding proposals 
that showed concrete successes and clear goals, two key elements in creating a favorable 
impression for receiving funds.  This was reflected in future grants, as NRDC for example, 
received a three-year grant for its MDB work at a level of $25,000 a year, and the Sierra Club‘s 
international program obtained a $25,000 grant for use in 1987.
21
  Summing up the MDB 
campaign and the RBF‘s role in an April 1988 internal memo, Wahman, proclaimed that ―[t]his 
was one of the best grants I‘ve been associated with at the RBF. The grant was in the hands of 
dedicated and competent leadership, was timely, was used effectively with great leverage . . . to 
produce a credible initiative regarding the multilateral development banks (MDBs).‖22 
 
The UNA and the ODC 
 Two other sets of NGO records I examined were those of the United Nations Association 
of America (UNA) and the Overseas Development Council (ODC).  Both of these organizations 
came into existence with the explicit mission of moving both U.S. policy elites and ordinary 
citizens to become more aware of global issues.  The UNA grew out of an earlier organization, 
the American Association for the United Nations (AAUN), which itself was decades old by 
1945, having initially been founded to support U.S. involvement with the League of Nations.  
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While the AAUN and UNA focused on more traditional diplomatic issues of war and peace, 
even in the early 1950s they were taking note of development concerns.  Rhetorically at least, the 
AAUN embraced a sweeping vision in which a ―well-timed universal disarmament program‖ 
would be implemented, one that would allow ―various countries [to] . . . finance a United 
Nations program of world economic and social development.‖23   
Whereas the UNA built a network of ―regular‖ Americans interested in promoting the 
U.N. and global piece, other organizations also emerged attempting to ensure sustained interest 
among U.S. citizens and governing elites in the affairs of the world, particularly the Global 
South.  Among these was the Overseas Development Council, founded in 1968 as a ―national 
citizen‘s organization  . . . to carry on a continuing program of reappraisal and education on the 
problems and needs of the less developed countries.‖24  ODC grew into an influential think tank 
by the early 1970s, publishing reports and organizing conferences on global development issues. 
While in numerous ways very different, the UNA and ODC share some key traits.  
Although the thrust of both of these organizations was generally liberal, both strongly supporting 
foreign aid and expressing skepticism of foreign policy that emphasized military force, neither 
saw themselves as political advocates.  In particular, both emphasized the need for consensus and 
dialogue among various interests, rather than any kind of hostility or political confrontation 
among interests.   
This perspective can be seen, for example, in examining UNA and ODC‘s boards of 
directors and major financial supporters.  In 1978, ODC‘s list of contributors included not only 
major philanthropic foundations, but also a wide array of multinational corporations, including 
Raytheon, Philip Morris, and Cargill, as well as a number of the major MDBs such as the World 
Bank.
25
  Similarly, ODC accepted funds from USAID, and its relations with that agency became 
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intertwined to the point that one RBF staffer, James N. Hyde, expressed in a memo that he hoped 
ODC would become ―less of an uncritical cheering section for USAID.‖26  On a similar note, in 
the mid-1970s, when the UNA moved to create a council of business and labor leaders, an RBF 
internal letter (unfortunately without names attached), asked bluntly whether such an initiative 
―is really needed?‖ – going on to question why more initiatives were needed amplifying the 
voice of ―establishment leadership‖ and not towards less represented voices such as ―young 
people‖ or ―radicals.‖27  
The general attitude of groups like UNA and ODC toward political change made them 
uncomfortable with efforts that involve hostility and confrontation between NGOs and 
international institutions.  One example of this comes from ODC‘s perspective on the 
environmentalists‘ MDB campaign.  By the late 1980s, while acknowledging that the 
environmentalists‘ lobbying had produced positive results, ODC staff also expressed concerns 
regarding the often confrontational approach the environmental groups took towards the MDBs.  
Complaining that environmental NGOs depicted the World Bank in their efforts as a ―near 
satanic institution with a seemingly insane desire to raze tropical forests,‖ ODC went on to see 
its role as bringing the sides ―together to sort out their differences and overlapping interests.‖28 
 
Religious NGOs and Infant Formula 
 One of the most significant NGO campaigns tackling development concerns in the 1970s 
and 1980s targeted multinational corporations, and their promotion and marketing of infant 
formula in the Global South.  While a multifaceted effort, this campaign became most strongly 
associated with the international boycott of Nestlé.  In the U.S. an important basis for this 
campaign came through mainline Protestant churches, in particular the National Council of 
Churches (NCC).   
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The RBF maintained a relationship with the NCC since the early 1950s.  However, by the 
late 1960s, these relations had grown increasingly strained.  These tensions primarily reflected 
the RBF‘s growing skepticism of the NCC‘s shift towards a greater emphasis on activism in this 
period, and its political shift to the left.  While the NCC long possessed a liberal reputation, 
through the late 1960s the leadership moved towards more radical politics, including involving 
itself, albeit indirectly, with support for leftist guerilla movements in southern Africa.   
RBF staff looked skeptically at the NCC‘s shift, primarily because they did not see the 
NCC as a good vessel for carrying out such a program.  As RBF staffer Yorke Allen, Jr. wrote in 
a June 1968 memo to John D. Rockefeller 3rd, while he felt that ―promotion of concepts such as 
‗justice‘, ‗peace‘ and ‗world development‘ fall within the purview of the Churches‘ outlook . . . 
they are not central to the main thrust of a religious organization.‖29  By 1974, while the NCC 
would still send program proposals to the RBF, it appears most of these were rejected.
30
  
However, at the same time, the RF built a solid relationship with one of the main 
offspring of the NCC‘s increased political engagement, the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility (ICCR), founded in 1970 as an NCC sponsored NGO.  ICCR‘s mission centered 
on channeling the institutional strength of churches (especially through their stock holdings in 
major U.S. companies) to bring pressure on corporations to adopt better policies on issues 
ranging from hiring discrimination to environmental impacts to workers‘ rights issues.  By the 
mid-1970s, ICCR came to increasingly focus on the controversy over multinational corporations‘ 
marketing of infant formula in the Global South.
31
  Corporations such as Nestlé and Bristol-
Myers aggressively promoted infant formula in the Global South as a modern alternative to 
breast-feeding.  However, as author and activist Andrew Chetley points out, safe use of infant 
formula requires a number of prerequisites, including sanitary conditions and literacy on part of 
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the mother, because if formula is used absent from these and other conditions, it can easily ―lead 
to a lethal mix of weak contaminated fluids, which in turn leave infants with gastroenteritis, 
diarrhea . . . malnutrition and even death.‖32  Activists in the U.S., Europe, and the Global South 
saw the infant formula issue as vital, both for its direct public health effects, as well as symbolic 
of larger issues of the interplay between people in the Global South and Western multinational 
corporations. 
Before this campaign transformed into the boycott of Nestlé, the primary tactic employed 
by ICCR was the shareholder resolution, with ICCR helping to coordinate churches to introduce 
resolutions before companies they held stock in.  In 1975, as it attempted to find shareholders 
with significant sway with companies such as Bristol-Myers, ICCR reached out to both the 
Rockefeller and Ford foundations, which were both major investors in Bristol-Myers.  Presenting 
the evidence about the harmful impacts of infant formula and its marketing, ICCR succeeded in 
obtaining important support from both foundations.  On April 21, 1975, Dr. John Knowles, 
president of the RF, sent a letter to Gavin MacBain, chairman of Bristol-Myers, requesting that 
the company publish ―all relevant information to the outer limits permitted by competitive 
considerations‖ about their marketing and promotion of formula.33  The RF also organized a 
number of meetings between company and NGO representatives to further efforts to find a 
solution.  Furthermore, both the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations gave five-hundred dollar  
donations to help augment ICCR‘s research of the negative health effects associated with misuse 
of infant formula in the Global South.
34
  Unfortunately, I could not locate documents indicating 
what role the RF played in the infant formula controversy after 1977, the year that the boycott of 
Nestlé began. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
 The materials I examined at the RAC proved to be quite valuable as I continue to 
research and begin to write my dissertation.  For one, they provide needed information and 
insight into other organizations that have archives and those that do not.  In addition, they are a 
window into the crucial relationship between NGOs and foundations.  While some critics portray 
foundations as a force of moderating and co-opting activist groups, my research points to a more 
complex relationship, in which many competing demands and interests, both on the parts of 
NGOs and foundations come into play.  I deeply appreciate the RAC providing me with the 
opportunity to conduct this research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editor's Note: This research report is presented here with the author‘s permission but should not be cited 
or quoted without the author‘s consent.  
Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports Online is a periodic publication of the Rockefeller 
Archive Center. Edited by Erwin Levold, Research Reports Online is intended to foster the network of 
scholarship in the history of philanthropy and to highlight the diverse range of materials and subjects 
covered in the collections at the Rockefeller Archive Center. The reports are drawn from essays submitted 
by researchers who have visited the Archive Center, many of whom have received grants from the 
Archive Center to support their research.  
The ideas and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and are not intended to 
represent the Rockefeller Archive Center. 
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